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The Disabled Student Athlete: Gaining a
Place on the Playing Field
By KATHLEEN DE SANTIS*
I
Introduction
The terms "athlete" and "handicapped"' are not mutually
exclusive. In the past, disabled students have demonstrated
outstanding athletic abilities. One legally blind youngster
played football and basketball, and was named to the all-star
team.2 Another blind student, who was also missing a leg, won
two varsity letters in wrestling.'
While every student may not become a superstar, evidence
from various sources strongly indicates that handicapped per-
sons who participate in athletic activities experience better
health, personal satisfaction and increased self-esteem.4 How-
ever, athletes with certain physical conditions such as diabe-
tes, vision in only one eye, one kidney, epilepsy, impaired
hearing or loss of one or more limbs have been disqualified
from participation in sports.
The school or athletic association barring the students argue
that these athletes should not participate for several reasons.
They contend that, for those students missing an organ, the
risk of injury to the remaining organ outweighs the benefits of
participation, and further that those students with impaired
sensory organs run the risk of injury to other body parts due to
* Member, Third Year Class. B.S., Mount Saint Mary's College, 1972; M.N., Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles, 1974. The author would like to specially thank
Arlene Mayerson, attorney for the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund.
1. The terms "handicapped" and "disabled" are used interchangeably in this
note. Both refer to individuals with the physical or mental impairments described as
"handicaps" by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act implementing regulations. See
infra notes 136-39.
2. Buelland & Mortagrini, Blind Children Integrated into Physical Education
Classes in New Jersey Schools, Up DATE, Feb. 1976. A student is considered legally
blind if he has central visual acuity of 20/200 or less in his better eye with the use of
corrective lens. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1382c (1973).
3. H. APPENZELLER & T. APPENZELLER, SPORTS AND THE CoURTs 34 (1980).
4. Stein, New Laws Open the Field to the Handicapped, 3 AMicus 25, 26 (1978).
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decreased ability to perceive sound or judge distances. More-
over, the argument goes, other players are more likely to be
injured due to the disabled athlete's impaired perception. And
finally, that sports activities are only games and not worth the
health, safety and future welfare of any student.5
Students with physical and mental impairments contend,
along with their parents, that they are not "handicapped" if
they are able to meet the physical performance criteria for an
athletic team and should be able to assume the risks of partici-
pation. When barred from playing, these students have sued
the school boards and athletic associations under several legal
theories.
This note describes the state of the law relating to the dis-
abled student athlete. First, it examines the administrative
structure of school athletic programs and discusses the meth-
ods of challenging athletic rules and decisions. It then turns to
possible constitutional challenges to athletic disqualification
actions. Finally, the note describes the Rehabilitation Act of
19736 and examines the courts' response to suits brought by
students under the statute. It concludes that the equal protec-
tion clause of the United States Constitution and section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act can be effective in combatting handicap
discrimination in school athletics.
II
Athletic Rules and Decisions
Each school usually has an athletic department to supervise
student sports.7 The school may also be a member of a local or
regional athletic conference of similar schools.' To avoid sanc-
tions, each member school must conduct its athletic program
in compliance with the provisions of the regional conference to
the extent that they are lawful and enforceable.'
Either the school or the athletic conference is responsible for
establishing and enforcing athletic eligibility requirements.' °
Generally, these rules are valid and enforceable as long as they
5. H. APPENZELLER & T. APPENZELLER, supra note 3, at 33-56.
6. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1976
Supp. m 1979)).
7. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPoRTs 4 (1979).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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are reasonable, issued pursuant to proper procedure and do
not exceed the authority granted to the school or athletic
body.' When a handicapped student believes that his inter-
ests have been unfairly affected by an athletic rule, he or she
may appeal through administrative channels and if still unsat-
isfied, may seek judicial review of that school's or athletic con-
ference's rule. 2
Traditionally, courts have given broad deference to the deci-
sions of school officials' 3 and athletic associations. 4 This
"hands-off" attitude is based on the principle that the review-
ing court has no authority to rewrite the rule because the legis-
lature placed the rulemaking power with the agency, not with
the court.'" Thus, the scope of judicial review is limited to de-
termining whether the action is a reasonable exercise of the
rulemaker's authority, or whether the action is constitutional.'
6
An athletic rule or decision is a "reasonable exercise of the
rulemaker's authority" if (1) the authority to make and enforce
the rule has been properly delegated to the school or athletic
conference; (2) the action taken is within the authority
granted; 7 and (3) the rule or decision is reasonable. 8
A. Authority Properly Delegated
In most states, the state legislature has the authority to
make and enforce school athletic rules.19 However, the legisla-
ture usually delegates to the district school boards the power
to make rules governing interscholastic and intercollegiate ath-
letics. This delegation includes the authority to make rules re-
garding eligibility for participation in extra-curricular
athletics.2 °
The courts are split on whether a school board may redele-
gate its power to make athletic rules to an athletic conference.
11. K DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01-1, at 654 (1976).
12. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702, 704, 706 (1974).
13. See generally Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
92 (1978); Wood v. Stickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975); Doe v. N. Y. Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 776
(2d Cir. 1981).
14. See California State Univ., Hayward v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 47
Cal. App. 3d 533, 539, 121 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1975).
15. K. DAVIS, supra note 11, § 29.01-1, at 654.
16. J. WEiSTART & C. LOwEL, supra note 7, at 45.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 46.
20. Id.
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In Bunger v. Iowa High School Athletic Association,21 the Iowa
Supreme Court held that a public body could not redelegate
matters of discretion or judgment. Because the promulgation
of eligibility rules involved both judgment and discretion, the
state board could not redelegate its rulemaking authority to an
athletic association.22 In contrast, a California appellate court
in Cabrillo Community College District of Santa Cruz County
v. California Junior College Association ,23 ruled that commu-
nity colleges may delegate authority to athletic associations to
regulate their athletic programs, but only as much power as
the colleges were given by the legislature. Thus, in Cabrillo
Community College, because the college did not have the au-
thority to deny admission based solely on residency require-
ments, the athletic association could not restrict eligibility for
athletic activities on residency standards.24
B. Within the Scope of Authority Granted
Once rulemaking authority is established, the court deter-
mines whether the challenged rule or action is within the
scope of legislatively granted authority. A school or athletic as-
sociation rule is valid if it is directly related to a proper subject
for the organization's administration, and is written to achieve
only that proper objective. 25
A recent case, Doe v. Marshall,26 considered the "proper
objectives" or rulemaking authority in the context of a disabled
athlete's rights. In Marshall, a high school student was dis-
qualified from the football team by an interscholastic league
rule which forbade participation in varsity athletics when a
student changed schools and did not thereafter reside in the
school district of his parents' residence.
The plaintiff had a history of mental illness coupled with vio-
lent behavior directed toward his parents. His therapist rec-
ommended that he live with his grandmother who resided in
another school district. The therapist also recommended that
21. 197 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1972). The court found that eligibility rules do not relate
merely to the internal operation of an athletic department but are an integral part of
the program. Therefore, since the legislature had placed the rule making power with
the schools, the schools could not redelegate that power to an athletic association.
22. Id. at 563.
23. 44 Cal. App. 3d 367, 118 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1975).
24. Id. at 372, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
25. J. WEISTART & C. LowEL, supra note 7, at 47-48.
26. 459 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Tex. 1978).
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he play football because he had excelled in that sport in the
past and it had served as a positive channel for his aggressive
behavior.
The court noted that the rule in question was designed to
prevent recruiting abuses and students' shopping around for a
coach and school. But as applied in this case, the rule arbitrar-
ily barred the student's participation where the sport was im-
portant for his emotional stability. The court held that to make
Doe ineligible because of the transfer was to make him ineligi-
ble because of his treatment for a handicapping condition in
violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.27 In this case,
the rule had not achieved its proper objective, the prevention
of recruiting abuse. Therefore, the disabled student's need to
participate outweighed the school board's desire to prevent
recruiting abuse, and the school was enjoined from enforcing
the rule.
C. The Rule Must Be Reasonable
Finally, to be enforceable, an athletic eligibility rule or deci-
sion must be "reasonable. ' 28 The rule must have a "rational
basis" or the decision must be "based on a consideration of the
relevant factors ... [and not result from] a clear error of judg-
ment. ' 29 When a court has a record of the school proceedings
to review, it may apply the "substantial evidence" test as
well.3 0 Substantial evidence means "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate"31 to validate the
rule or decision.
Many schools base their decision to disqualify a disabled
student on the guidelines set forth by the American Medical
Association's (AMA) Disqualifying Conditions for Sports Par-
27. Id. at 1192. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is described in part IV of this note.
See infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
28. See supra note 11.
29. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); see
also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706, subd. (2)(A) (1974).
30. Id. at § 706, subd. (2)(E). See also Davis, supra note 11, at 656-60.
31. Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
No. 3]
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ticipation.3 2 The AMA guidelines divide athletic activities into
four categories: collision, contact, non-contact and other, and
32. Disqualifying Conditions for Sports Participation
(AMA Revised 1976)
Conditions Collisiona Contactb Noncontactc Otherd
GENERAL
Acute infections:
Respiratory,
genitourinary,
infectious
mononucleosis,
hepatitis, active
rheumatic fever,
active tuberculosis X X X X
Obvious physical
immaturity in
comparison with other
competitors X X
Hemorrhagic disease:
Hemophilia, purpura,
and other serious
bleeding tendencies X X X
Diabetes, inadequately
controlled X X X X
Diabetes, controlled
Jaundice X X X X
EYES
Absence or loss of
function of one eye X X
RESPIRATORY
Tuberculosis (active or
symptomatic) X X X X
Severe pulmonary
insufficiency X X X X
CARDIOVASCULAR
Mitral stenosis, aortic
stenosis, aortic
insufficiency,
coarctation of aorta,
cyanotic heart
disease, recent
carditis of any
etiology X X X X
Hypertension on
organic basis X X X X
Previous heart surgery
for congenital or
acquired heart
disease*
LIVER
Enlarged liver X X
SKIN
Boils, impetigo, and
herpes simplex
gladiatorum X X
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recommend when a student with a particular physical condi-
Conditions Collisiona Contactb Noncontactc Otherd
SPLEEN
Enlarged spleen X X
HERNIA
Inguinal or femoral
hernia X X X
MUSCULOSKELETAL
Symptomatic
abnormalities or
inflammations X X X X
Functional inadequacy
of the
musculoskeletal
system, congenital or
acquired,
incompatible with
the contact or skill
demands of the sport X X X
NEUROLOGICAL
History or symptoms
of previous serious
head trauma, or
repeated concussions X
Controlled convulsive
disorder"
Convulsive disorder
not completely
controlled by
medication X X X
Previous surgery on
head X X
RENAL
Absence of one kidney X X
Renal disease X X X X
GENITALIA***
Absence of one testicle
Undescended testicle
aFootball, rugby, hockey, lacrosse, tec.
bBaseball, soccer, basketball, wrestling, etc.
cCross country, track, tennis, crew, swimming, etc.
dBowling, golf, archery, field events, etc.
* Each patient should be judged on an individual basis in conjunction with his car-
diologist and operating surgeon.
** Each patient should be judged on an individual basis. All things being equal, it is
probably better to encourage a young boy or girl to participate in a non-contact
sport rather than a contact sport. However, if a particular patient has a great
desire to play a contact sport, and this is deemed a major ameliorating factor in
his/her adjustment to school, associates and the seizure disorder, serious consid-
eration should be given to letting him/her participate if the seizures are
controlled.
* The Committee approves the concept of contact sports participation for youths
with only one testicle or with an undescended testicle(s), except in specific cases
such as an inguinal canal undescended testicle(s), following appropriate medical
COMM/ENT L. J.
tion should be disqualified from any category.3 For example,
an individual with a controlled seizure disorder (epilepsy) is
not absolutely disqualified from any category. The AMA in-
stead advises that each student be judged individually, stating
that
[aIll things being equal, it is probably better to encourage a
young boy or girl to participate in a non-contact sport ....
However, if a [student] has a great desire to play a contact
sport, and this is deemed to be a major ameliorating factor in
his/her adjustment to school ... serious consideration should
be given to letting him/her participate if the seizures are
controlled.34
The school or athletic association has the burden of proving
that the disqualification rule or decision is reasonable. 35 But
given the courts' traditional "hands-off" attitude toward school
and athletic association actions, a school's action on a decision,
supported by medical testimony that the student could suffer
severe injury if allowed to participate in a particular sport, will
rarely be enjoined by a court even if the court does not agree
with the school's decision.
The case of Spitaleri v. Nyquist 36 illustrates the student's
problem of proving that a rule is unreasonable when the school
relies on the AMA guidelines. The student, Spitaleri, had al-
most complete loss of vision in one eye. He was barred from
playing high school football by the school physician who relied
on the AMA criteria that disqualified a student with limited vi-
sion from collision sports. The boy's father argued that the de-
nial of the opportunity to play football was psychologically
damaging to his son and agreed to waive the school's responsi-
bility by personally assuming all risks involved. The school
still prohibited Spitaleri from playing. The case was appealed
to the New York Commissioner of Education who supported
the judgment of the physician.
Later, the court held that the determination of the Commis-
sioner could not be judicially set aside unless it was found to
evaluation to rule out unusual injury risk. However, the athlete, parents and
school authorities should be fully informed that participation in contact sports for
such youths with only one testicle does carry a slight injury risk to the remaining
healthy testicle. Following such an injury, fertility may be adversely affected.
But the chances of an injury to a descended testicle are rare, and the injury risk
can be further substantially minimized with an athletic supporter and protective
device.
33. Id.
34. Id. at guidelines note **
35. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 556, subd. (d) (1974).
36. 74 Misc. 2d 811, 345 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1973).
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be "purely arbitrary. '37 In this case, the examining officer cited
the AMA guidelines as the basis for his decision to disqualify
Spitaleri. The court stated, "Clearly, the concern of the AMA
and of the school physician ... is the always present danger of
injury ... which, it if should occur, would result in irreversible
and permanent injury. '38
Thus, in athletic eligibility cases, the student cannot expect
the court to intrude into the discretionary rulings of athletic
administrators. The New York state legislature recognized the
difficulty in reversing an athletic eligibility decision and en-
acted Education Law section 4409,39 originally entitled the
"Spitaleri Bill." The legislators explained their purpose:
Because the State Education Department has tied together the
medical and legal issues, a student who has a disqualifying
condition cannot expect to receive permission to play a contact
sport, regardless of the fact that objectively he might be medi-
cally capable. In addition, such decisions are insulated by the
procedure for appealing administrative determinations; this
procedure does not afford to the petitioner the review of the
merits of conflicting opinions. The concern of both the court
and the Commissioner is with the possible arbitraries of the
determination. If the school physician's decision has some ba-
sis in reason, it will be upheld. The conflicting opinion from a
private physician is not reviewed or considered even though it
might be more reasonable. 40
Education Law section 4409 provides:
Upon a school district's determination that a student shall not
be permitted to participate in an athletic program by reason of
a physical impairment ... the student may commence a spe-
cial proceeding ... to enjoin the school district from prohibit-
ing his participation .... The court shall grant such petition if
it is satisfied that it is in the best interest of the student to par-
ticipate in an athletic program and that it is reasonably safe for
him to do so.
4 1
The statute provides for meaningful judicial review in light
of the handicapped student's "best interests" and safety. It
also contains provisions which insulate the school district from
liability "for any injury sustained by a student participating
37. Id. at 812, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
38. Id.
39. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 4409 (McKinney 1977).
40. H. APPENZELLER & T. APPENZELLER, supra note 3, at 40.
41. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 4409, subds. 1, 3 (McKinney 1977).
No. 31
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pursuant to an order granted under this section .... "42
The statute's usefulness is illustrated in Kampmeier v. Ny-
quist.11 Margaret Kampmeier had a congenital cataract in one
eye but was one of the best athletes in her class. When the
school disqualified her from participating in athletics, she first
sued in the federal courts and lost." She then sued in the New
York state court under Education Law section 4409.41 The trial
court concluded that while it would be reasonably safe for Mar-
garet to engage in contact sports while wearing protective
glasses, it would not be in her best interests to participate be-
cause the school district would have "broad and lasting immu-
nity" from liability for injuries that Margaret might suffer while
playing pursuant to court order.' The New York Appellate Di-
vision, however, reversed.4 1 It held that a school district's stat-
utory immunity from liability should not be a factor when
considering the "best interest of the student," and allowed
Margaret to participate. 48
Absent a statute similar to the New York law, the student
athlete with a physical impairment cannot expect to succeed in
overturning an athletic disqualification action unless he or she
sues under additional legal theories.
III
Constitutional Challenge of an Athletic
Disqualification Decision
A student can increase his or her chance of participating in a
particular sport by challenging an unfavorable rule on equal
protection 49 or due process 50 grounds.
A. Equal Protection
Application of the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution requires the court to determine whether a
42. Id. at subd. 4.
43. Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
44. Id.
45. Kampmeier v. Harris, 93 Misc. 2d 1032, 403 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
46. Id. at 1036, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
47. Kampmeier v. Harris, 66 A.D.2d 1014, 411 N.Y.S.2d 744 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
48. Id. at 1014, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 746.
49. "[N]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deny to any person
... the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
50. "[NJor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend XlV, § I.
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classification in a rule promulgated by "state action 5 1 consti-
tutes arbitrary discrimination, or differentiates between
classes of persons on constitutionally insufficient grounds.52
Traditionally, the Supreme Court has used two tiers of review
to analyze equal protection claims: strict scrutiny and minimal
scrutiny.53 The Burger Court has added a third tier, intermedi-
ate scrutiny24
Minimal scrutiny is usually applied to test the validity of a
non-suspect classification that does not affect a fundamental
interest.5 5 Under this standard, classifications are upheld if
they are reasonably related to achieving a legitimate state in-
terest.56 The court presumes that the rulemaker's purposes
are proper and gives those devising the classifications wide dis-
cretion to accomplish their objectives .5  Thus, a valid classifi-
cation may not affect all persons similarly situated if the
purpose for "under-inclusion" is to effect a step-by-step ap-
proach to the problem.58 Or, a valid classification may cover
additional persons not originally intended to be included as
long as there is a legitimate purpose for the "overinclusive"
classification. 9 Under minimal scrutiny, the classifications are
51. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
52. J. WEISTART & C. LOWEJ, supra note 7, at 49-50.
53. For examples of the minimal scrutiny scope of review see Mathews v. De Cas-
tro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976), Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), and Williamson
v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955). For examples of strict scrutiny scope of review see
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). For an over-
view of judicial review of equal protection claims see L TRmBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrU-
TONAL LAw 994-1002 (1978).
54. The most recent formulation of the intermediate scrutiny test is in Plyler v.
Doe, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2382 (1982).
[WI e have recognized that certain forms of legislative classification, while not
facially invidious, nonetheless give rise to recurring constitutional difficulties;
in these limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the classifi-
cation reflects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protec-
tion by inquiring whether it may fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial
interest of the State.
Id. at 2395.
55. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-44 (1973).
See also Blattner, The Supreme Court's "Intermediate" Equal Protection Decisions:
Five Imperfect Models of Constitutional Equality, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 777, 783
(1981).
56. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Fla., 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
57. See generally Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
58. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
59. L. TRME, supra note 53, at 999; see generally, Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307 (1976).
No. 31
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invalid only if they are "clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary
power, not an exercise of judgment."6 Indeed as one writer
has noted, "minimal scrutiny in theory is virtually none in
fact., 61
The strict scrutiny review is applied to test the validity of a
classification that touches on a "fundamental interest"62 or is
based on "suspect criteria."63 Judicial strict scrutiny operates
on the principle that certain actions must be subjected to close
analysis by the court in order to preserve values of equality
and liberty.6 This standard requires that a classification be
precise and that it promote a "compelling interest" of the body
promulgating the classification. The rulemaker is required to
rebut the presumption that its interests could not be protected
by a more narrowly drawn classification or by a less drastic al-
ternative.6 Generally, "scrutiny that [is] strict in theory [is]
fatal in fact."67
There are two basic tests to identify a classification as "sus-
pect." First, the class must be a "discrete and insular minor-
ity, '68 a class that can be easily distinguished from the rest of
society.69 Second, the class must be "saddled with such disa-
bilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
60. Mathews v. De Castro, 429 U.S. 181, 185 (1976), upholding a Social Security Ad-
ministration provision providing "wife's insurance benefits" to wives living with hus-
bands, but not to divorced wives.
61. Gunther, The Supreme Court; 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L
RFV. 1, 8 (1972).
62. Fundamental interests have included voting (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533
(1964)), criminal appeals (Griffin v. Ill., 351 U.S. 12 (1956)), marriage, (Loving v. Va., 388
U.S. 1 (1967)), interstate travel (Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)), and divorce
(Brodie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371 (1971)).
63. Suspect criteria have included race (McLaughlin v. Fla., 379 U.S. 184 (1964)),
alienage (Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)), wealth [when coupled with a funda-
mental interest] (McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969)).
64. L. TRmE, supra note 53, at 1000.
65. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
66. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S., 351, 357-358 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. Gunther, supra note 61, at 8.
68. In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), the
Court states, "Prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condi-
tion, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordina-
rily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry."
69. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513-514 (1976).
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the majoritarian political process. ' 'v  In recent years it has
been suggested that physical or mental handicap is a "suspect
criteria" and that classifications based on a disability should be
subject to strict scrutiny."' Those advocating suspect class sta-
tus for disabled individuals argue that, "[a] s a class repeatedly
abused and neglected by society and its public officials and in-
stitutions, handicapped persons have a legitimate claim for
special judicial solicitude under the equal protection clause."72
Others argue that while disabled persons may meet the "dis-
crete and insular minority" test, only three subclasses of dis-
abled persons meet both tests for suspect class: the mentally
retarded, the epileptic and the multiply handicapped.7 3 How-
ever, the majority of courts have held that handicapped per-
sons as a group do not constitute a suspect class and thus
regulations and laws affecting them do not trigger strict
scrutiny. 4
The Burger Court has introduced an intermediate level of
70. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
71. See In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 446-47 (N.D. 1974):
While the Supreme Court of the United States, using the "traditional" equal
protection analysis, held that the Texas system of educational financing,
which relied largely upon property taxes, was constitutional, we are confident
that the same court would have held that G.H.'s terrible handicaps [multiple
birth defects] were just the sort of "immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth" to which the "inherently suspect" classification
would be applied, and that depriving her of a meaningful educational opportu-
nity would be just the sort of denial of equal protection which has held uncon-
stitutional in cases involving discrimination based on race and illegitimacy
See also Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 959 (E.D. Pa. 1975) where the court
stated that the Rodriguez test should certainly be read to include retarded children.
"Retarded children are precluded from the political process and have been neglected
by state legislatures. Moreover, the label 'retarded' might bear as great a stigma as
any racial slur."
72. Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualifications of
Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15
SANTA CLARA L J., 855, 902 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Burgdorf and Burgdorf].
73. Comment, The Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses: Two Means of Im-
plementing "Integrationism "for Handicapped Applicants for Public Employment, 27
DE PAUL L. REV. 1169 (1978).
74. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 992 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1976), blind per-
sons are not members of a suspect class because classifications based on blindness can
be justified by the different abilities of the blind and the sighted; In re Levy, 38 N.Y.2d
653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13, 15 (1976), handicapped children do not constitute a
suspect classification; New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children Inc., v. Rockefeller,
357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D. N.Y. 1973), retarded children are not a suspect class, no
reason given.
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scrutiny" but has yet to firmly establish when this level of ju-
dicial review is appropriate.7 6 Two circumstances seem to trig-
ger intermediate scrutiny: a significant interference with an
important, though not necessarily "fundamental," liberty or
benefit "vital to the individual"; or use of "sensitive, although
not necessarily suspect, criteria of classification."77
One commentator believes that past discrimination against
the handicapped as a class may make that group suitable for
quasi-suspect treatment.78 Another author, reasoning that dis-
abled persons as a group are not likely to receive suspect class
status, also argues that handicapped persons constitute a
quasi-suspect class. 79 This second author contends that a
Supreme Court opinion, Weber v. Aetna Casualty and Surety
Co. ,80 describes two characteristics of a quasi-suspect class:
(1) members of the class possess a common permanent trait,
and (2) because of this trait, members of the class as a whole
have been subjected to unjust and illogical discrimination.8
He argues that handicapped persons, as a class, meet both cri-
teria. They possess disabilities that are permanent and they
have suffered discrimination in education, transportation and
employment.8 2 He concludes that under the Weber test, handi-
capped persons are a quasi-suspect class which should be af-
75. See supra note 54.
76. Blattner, supra note 55, at 779.
77. L. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 1090. To date, "important thought not fundamental
interests" have included eligibility for employment in a major sector of the economy
(Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1976)), retaining one's drivers license
(Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971)), obtaining higher education at an affordable
tuition (Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 459 (1973) (White, J., concurring)), receiving
subsistence benefits [food stampsI (U.S.D.A. v. Murrey, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring)), and perhaps basic education (Plyler v. Doe, -U.S. -, S. Ct. 2382,
2398 (1982)).
"Sensitive" criteria have included gender (Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)), alien-
age (Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976)), illegitimacy (Trimble v. Gordon,
430 U.S. 762 (1977)), and the undocumented status of children (Plyer v. Doe, 102 S. Ct.
2382, 2396-97 (1982)).
78. L. TRIBE, supra note 53, at 1081 n.17.
79. Comment, supra note 73, at 1187.
80. 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (striking down a state workmen's compensation law which
denied benefits to dependent illegitimate children on the death of their natural father).
81. Comment, supra note 73, at 1187.
82. As of 1978, approximately 13,370,000 persons with handicaps have difficulty us-
ing mass transit systems as presently designed. Over 2.2 million handicapped children
receive schooling inadequate for their needs. Another 1.75 million receive no schooling
at all. And, an estimated 19 million handicapped persons face employment discrimina-
tion. Comment, supra note 73, at 1177 n.45.
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forded protection under the intermediate scrutiny review.83
A federal court in Frederick L. v. Thomas ,84 held that chil-
dren with learning disabilities were members of a "quasi-sus-
pect" class and were entitled to intermediate scrutiny. These
children "exhibited the essential characteristics of suspect
classes-minority status and powerlessness. [The court
thought] that the Supreme Court, if presented with the plain-
tiffs' equal protection claim, would apply the as yet hard to de-
fine middle test of equal protection, sometimes referred to as
'strict rationality.' "85 A second court, in Sterling v. Harris,86
held that a classification based on mental health should re-
ceive intermediate scrutiny: "[TJhe common indicia that
mental health shares with suspect classifications are of suffi-
cient importance to require the present statutory classification
to pass an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny."87
Once the court determines that the class merits some form
of heightened review, it employs various approaches to ana-
lyze the classification under intermediate scrutiny. The "im-
portant governmental objectives" approach requires that a
classification be justified by more than governmental efficiency
or "administrative ease and convenience."88 The "close fit"
technique requires that classifications be "substantially re-
lated to the rule's purpose in order to justify the inequality."89
The third approach, "requiring current articulation,"90 allows
the court to ignore any rationale not articulated in the classifi-
cations defense. This requirement becomes important when
those responsible for enforcing a rule no longer share the ide-
ology behind the rule as it was originally expressed. Under the
"actual purpose" analysis,9 the court refuses to consider clas-
83. Id. at 1187.
84. 408 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
85. Id. at 836.
86. 478 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
87. Id. at 1053.
88. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
89. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 201-02 where the court said that the protec-
tion of the public health and safety was clearly an important state and local interest,
but the statistics-that .18% of females and 2% of males between the ages of 18 and 20
were arrested for drunk driving-provided "an unduly tenuous" fit "to justify a gender
based rule regulating the sale of beer to 18 to 20 year olds."
90. See, e.g., Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) where the court struck down a
state ban on the use of contraceptives without even a reference to an obvious reason
for the ban-that sex without a childbearing purpose was immoral or that population
expansion was desired. See also L. TRmE, supra note 53, at 1085.
91. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975).
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sification rationales that are not supported by the rule's lan-
guage or history. The final approach, "permitting rebuttal, '92
requires that individuals disadvantaged by a classification be
given an opportunity to rebut the presumption and become ex-
ceptions to the rule, that is, to convince the rulemakers that
they ought to prevail despite the "rationality" of the rule.
Applying these three levels of scrutiny to a handicap-based
classification in an athletic eligibility rule, it is clear that the
student's chance of overturning a disqualification ruling will be
greatly influenced by the level of scrutiny that the court em-
ploys. Under minimal scrutiny, an athletic eligibility rule dis-
qualifying specific classes of physically or mentally impaired
students is constitutional if the classification is reasonably re-
lated to a legitimate state interest, such as the students' health
and safety. Because the court presumes that the rule is ra-
tional, the student will almost always fail in an attempt to re-
verse the disqualification. Essentially, minimal scrutiny
affords the same scope of review as the administrative pro-
ceeding "reasonableness" review provided in Spitaleri v. Ny-
quist.93 As long as the court finds any rational basis for
disqualifying the athlete-for example, that he could injure his
one functioning eye94 or that he might be hurt because of his
decreased ability to perceive the actions of the sport around
him9 5-it will not disturb the decision even though it may not
agree with the result.
Under strict scrutiny, the court would presume that an ath-
letic eligibility rule barring certain classes of disabled students
is unconstitutional and the rulemaker would have the burden
of proving that its interests could not be protected by a more
narrowly drawn classification, or by some less drastic alterna-
tive than disqualification. However, it is quite unlikely that the
current Court will afford this heightened scrutiny to disabled
students challenging athletic disqualification decisions.96
92. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772-77 (1975) and Turner v. Department of
Employment Security, 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975). "The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that [a state] must achieve legitimate state ends through more individualized means
when basic human liberties are at stake."
93. 74 Misc. 2d 811, 345 N.Y.S.2d 878 (1973).
94. Id.; and see Kampmeier v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296.
95. Colombo v. Sewanhaka Central High School, Dist. No. 2, 87 Misc. 2d 48, 383
N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976).
96. In numerous recent cases the Court has failed to enlarge the number of classi-
fications entitled to strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex-
based classification); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (classification based on
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Finally, under the intermediate standard of review, the
rulemaker would have to demonstrate that disqualification of a
particular class is rationally related to an important govern-
mental objective. Alternatively, the court could require the
rule to closely fit the school's purpose and also require the rule
enforcers to acknowledge the value judgment behind the rule.
Finally, the court could allow the individual athlete to rebut
the presumption that someone with her disability cannot
safely participate.
A disabled student may be disqualified from playing a partic-
ular sport because the school authorities assume that a deaf
student cannot play football, a legally blind student cannot
play basketball, a student with epilepsy should not participate
on the track team (too strenuous) or a student who is missing
a limb should not compete on the swim team (unfair disadvan-
tage). Intermediate scrutiny would allow a more searching re-
view of the disqualification decision in each case.
For example, a student could challenge the "important gov-
ernmental objective" of promoting his health by arguing that
disqualification is in fact psychologically damaging. He could
contend that a disqualification rule should be drawn more nar-
rowly-an interscholastic rule that originally barred anyone
with an artificial hand, arm or leg from participating in football,
wrestling or soccer should be revised to read, "artificial limbs,
which in the judgment of the officials administering the rules,
are no more dangerous to players than the corresponding
human limb and do not place an opponent at a disadvantage,
may be permitted."97
A student could also force the rulemakers to acknowledge
the value judgment behind the classification-the segregative
and paternalistic attitude that society has generally taken to-
ward disabled persons. Finally, the student could rebut the
general presumption that it is dangerous for her to participate
with evidence that she can play safely. One student, John Co-
lombo, employed this strategy.98 John had a fifty percent hear-
ing loss in his left ear and was completely deaf in his right ear.
illegitimacy); Mass. Bd. at Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (age-based classifi-
cation) and San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (classification
based on wealth).
97. Stein, supra note 4, at 30.
98. Colombo v. Sewanhaka Central High School, Dist. No. 2, 87 Misc. 2d 48, 383
N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976).
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The New York State Department of Education barred him
from participating in all contact sports in accordance with the
AMA guidelines.9 At trial, the Assistant Director of Admis-
sions at Gallaudet, a liberal arts college for the deaf, testified
for the plaintiff. He reported that 1,200 to 1,800 deaf athletes
competed in the Deaf Olympics, including 700 competing in
contact sports. He testified that fifty-nine schools sponsored
contact sports for the deaf and that his college competed
against college teams with non-handicapped athletes. Further,
he knew of no athletic injury attributed to a hearing impair-
ment. 100 The Chairman of the Committee on the Medical As-
pects of Sports Association of New York, also testified that
John should be allowed to play contact sports because he saw
no danger to John or to any other participants because of
John's hearing loss.
In spite of the expert's testimony, John was not allowed to
play because the court found three risk factors that provided a
rational basis for the administrative decision. First, injury to
the ear with partial hearing could result in permanent deaf-
ness. Second, John stood a greater chance of injury because of
his inability to perceive the direction of sound. And third, be-
cause of his inability to perceive sounds adequately, he was
also a threat to other players' safety.
The Colombo court, however, was reviewing an administra-
tive decision that had to be upheld if the court found a reason-
able basis for it. If John had been given intermediate scrutiny,
the court would not have been forced to uphold the decision
but could have allowed John to rebut the presumption that
hearing-impaired athletes face significantly greater risks while
playing contact sports than their non-hearing-impaired peers.
Or, the court might have narrowed the rule to fit the safety ob-
jective by requiring that hearing-impaired students wear pro-
tective ear guards over their non-impaired ear while
participating.
In summary, equal protection requires that the disabled stu-
dent not be treated differently from his non-handicapped
peers. Several lower courts have begun to examine classifica-
tions based on handicap under the more searching intermedi-
ate scrutiny review. It is hoped that this "toothier" review will
99. See supra note 32.
100. 383 N.Y.S.2d at 520-21.
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force schools and athletic associations to examine their dis-
qualification decisions closely to insure that they are based on
more than administrative convenience or outmoded paternalis-
tic attitudes toward disabled youngsters.
Clearly, the disabled student-athlete stands a better chance
of succeeding on the merits of an equal protection claim if the
court can be persuaded to utilize intermediate scrutiny to ex-
amine the classification disqualifying him from participation.
B. Procedural Due Process
The due process clause of the United States Constitution
also is available as a basis for challenging the validity of ath-
letic rules that bar disabled students from participating in cer-
tain sports. Due process requires that an individual not be
deprived of life, liberty or property without an adequate deter-
mination that the deprivation is justified.10 ' When analyzing a
due process challenge, the court uses a three-step approach. It
determines whether the plaintiff has a liberty or property in-
terest; whether governmental action has impaired that inter-
est; and, if impairment is found, it determines what procedures
must be followed to satisfy due process under the
circumstances. 102
The courts have differed on whether the right to participate
in sports is entitled to due process protection as a liberty or a
property right. Because the right to an education is clearly a
due process property right, 03 the key issue is whether athletic
activities are an integral part of the educational program.
Those who argue that participation in athletics is an integral
part of education share the view that athletics perform the es-
sential socializing function in the educational process, instil-
ling an aspiration for excellence, building character, and
teaching teamwork, cooperation and motivation. 0 Those who
argue for non-inclusion view athletics as the antithesis of edu-
cation, as mere physical diversion,'0 or as a privilege, not a
right entitled to due process protection.'0 6
101. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974).
102. See generally Bd. of Curators Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978);
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
103. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1974).
104. J. WEISTART & S. LowEL, supra note 7, at 21-22.
105. Id. at 22.
106. See generally Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th
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A second requirement for due process protection is state ac-
tion. °7 The term "state action" covers any person or organiza-
tion associated with or performing the functions of
governmental entities.'018 The decisions of public school au-
thorities-whether elementary, secondary or college-level-
constitute state action. 109 Athletic associations that govern
statewide school athletic programs are also viewed as instru-
mentalities of the state."0 Therefore, if a decision to disqualify
a student from athletic participation is made by or enforced by
any principal or agent of the public school system, such action
is state action for due process purposes.
If the court decides that state action has impaired a liberty or
property interest, it then determines what procedures must be
followed to satisfy due process under the circumstances."'
Several courts have held that athletic participation is entitled
to the same protection as other educational rights."2 The hold-
ings have been justified by various rationales, including the
views that sports activities provide an important means of ob-
taining a college education through athletic scholarships" 3 and
that athletic participation may be of economic importance be-
cause the resulting publicity and media exposure may facili-
tate future employment."14
In Evans and Redding v. Looney," 5 two outstanding college
athletes at Missouri Western State college were disqualified by
Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. Louisiana High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.
1970).
107. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11-15 (1883).
108. See Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
109. See, e.g., Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970).
110. Wright v. Ark. Activities Ass'n, 501 F.2d 25 (8th Cir. 1974); Assoc'd, Students,
Inc. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 493 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. La.
High School Athletic Ass'n, 430 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1970).
111. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). The Rehabilitation Act implementing regula-
tions specifies the procedural safeguards necessary to satisfy due process when classi-
fying a student as handicapped and in need of special education. See infra notes 144-48
and accompanying text.
112. Brenden v. Indep. School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973); Moran v.
School Dist. No. 7, Yellowstone County, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972); Davis v.
Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Cabrillo Community College Dist. of Santa
Cruz County v. Cal. Junior College Ass'n, 44 Cal. App. 3d 367, 118 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1975).
113. Regents of University of Minnesota v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 560
F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977); Davis v. Meek, 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
114. See Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F.
Supp. 602 (D. Minn. 1972); see also J. WEISTART & C. LowxL, supra note 7, at 23.
115. No. 77-6052-CV-SJ., (W.D. Mo. 1977) in 3 Amicus 48 (1978).
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the team physician because they were both blind in one eye.
Both were highly regarded football prospects and Redding was
reportedly on the prospect list of professional teams in the Na-
tional Football League. The court found that refusal to let the
plaintiffs play deprived them of equal protection of the law and
denied them liberty without due process. They were allowed
to play after signing a waiver releasing the college from
liability.
In Davis v. Meek,"' a case involving a high school baseball
star who married a fellow student in his senior year of high
school, the court granted a preliminary injunction requiring
the school to allow the student to play baseball despite a
school rule that barred married students from participating in
extra-curricular activities. The court noted:
[PI art of the function of educating children is to provide them
with the basic knowledge and training necessary to becoming
productive adult citizens. However much one may share
Thomas Jefferson's scorn for games that are played with a ball,
professional baseball is nowadays ... [an] important commer-
cial activity .... Hence it is difficult to refute the argument
that a secondary school system that deprives a student of the
opportunity to develop his full potential for entering the field of
professional baseball is not functioning as it should. When this
deprivation [occurs] as a disciplinary measure in an attempt to
attain objectives, however commendable, of doubtful legal va-
lidity, the problem becomes somewhat more sharply in
focus.
1 17
Therefore, due process demands that the student not be de-
prived of the right to an education without some procedural
protections. These protections, however, have not yet been
clearly spelled out in the area of physical education.
IV
Challenging a Decision Under
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
In the 1970's section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act" 8 specifi-
cally opened the locker room doors to disabled students. This
legislation has become the main vehicle for suits by disabled
athletes.
116. 344 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ohio 1972).
117. Id. at 301.
118. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1976 & Supp. El 1979).
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A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
The Rehabilitation Act came about as a legislative response
to long-standing discrimination against handicapped per-
sons." 9 Society has historically dealt with disabled individuals
by segregating them from the mainstream of society and deny-
ing them access to the benefits and opportunities available to
others. 2 ° The following statute, valid until 1974, reveals a tradi-
tional legislative reaction to the handicapped:
No person who is diseased, maimed, mutilated or in any way
deformed so as to be an unsightly or disgusting object or im-
proper person to be allowed in or on the public ways or other
public places in this city, shall therein or thereon expose him-
self to public view, under a penalty of not less than one dollar
nor more than fifty dollars for each offense.' 2 '
For many years this segregation and inequality was endured
without protest but, following the black civil rights movement
of the 1960's, a legal advocacy movement for handicapped peo-
ple emerged. Handicapped persons realized that they could
use the courts to raise society's consciousness and to secure
their constitutionally-guaranteed rights.'22 The activity in the
courts led to a significant reformation of legislative attitudes
toward disabled persons. This attitudinal change culminated
in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.123 The Act was intended to
eliminate discrimination against the handicapped in employ-
ment and education. Section 504 of the Act is patterned after
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964124 and title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 1972.125 Section 504 of the Act provides:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United
States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any
Executive agency .... The head of each such agency shall
119. For a thorough description of the unequal treatment afforded handicapped per-
sons, see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 72, at 861-75.
120. BURGDORF, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF HANDICAPPED PERSONS 51 (1980).
121. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § L6-34 (repealed 1974), discussed in Burgdorf &
Burgdorf, supra note 72, at 863.
122. Burgdorf, supra note 120, at 52.
123. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1976 & Supp. m 1979).
124. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (1976) (prohibiting discrimination on the ground of race,
color or national origin).
125. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex).
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promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the amendments to this section .... 12 6
In 1977, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
12 7
promulgated regulations to effectuate section 504.128 The regu-
lations were designed to eliminate discrimination on the basis
of handicap in any program receiving federal financial assist-
ance. As direct recipients of federal financial aid, public
schools are clearly subject to section 504. Therefore, schools
must comply with the regulations or suffer termination of their
federal monies.'29 Any person who witnesses or suffers dis-
crimination based on handicap may file a complaint with the
Department of Health and Human Services. 3 '
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether section 504
creates a private right of action in favor of a person injured by
its violation,' 3 ' but several circuit courts have held that it
does.132 The Second Circuit reasoned that because the Reha-
bilitation Act is patterned after section 601 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,133 and was clearly intended for the specific benefit
of handicapped persons, a private right of action is consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. 134
1. Section 504 and the Disabled Athlete
The section 504 regulations specifically address the disabled
student's right to participate in physical education and extra-
curricular athletic activities.
In providing physical education courses and athletics and simi-
lar programs and activities to any of its students, a recipient
... may not discriminate on the basis of handicap. A recipient
that offers physical education courses or that operates or spon-
sors interscholastic, club, or intramural athletics, shall provide
126. Id. The definition of "handicapped person" in the regulations conforms to the
statutory definition in section 706(7). See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
127. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare was renamed the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services in 1980.
128. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.1-84.61 (1977).
129. 45 C.F.R. § 84.1 (1977).
130. Hermann, Sports and the Handicapped: Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and Curricular, Intramural, Club and Intercollegiate Athletic Programs in Post
Secondary Educational Institutions, 45 J.C. & U.L. 143, 157 (1977-1979).
131. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 n.5 (1979).
132. Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1981); Lloyd v. Regional
Transportation Authority, 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Federa-
tion v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964).
134. Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d at 774.
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to qualified handicapped students an equal opportunity for
participation in these activities.1
35
Under the statute and the regulations, a student is "handi-
capped" if he or she has a physical or mental impairment'36
which substantially limits one or more major life activities, 137
"has a record of" such impairment, 138 or is "regarded as hav-
ing" such an impairment.139 Students with asthma, diabetes,
135. 45 C.F.R. § 84.37(c)(1) (1977).
"Recipient" means any instrumentality of the state or its political subdivision, any
public or private agency, organization, institution or person who receives Federal
financial assistance. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1977).
When referring to post-secondary educational institutions, the regulations substi-
tute the term "intercollegiate" for "interscholastic." 45 C.F.R. § 84.47(a) (1) (1977).
"Qualified handicapped person" means with respect to public preschool, elemen-
tary, secondary or adult educational services, (i) a handicapped person of an age dur-
ing which non-handicapped persons are provided with such services, (ii) of any age
during which it is mandatory under state law to provide such services to handicapped
persons, or (iii) to whom a state is required to provide free appropriate public educa-
tion under section 612 of the Education For All Handicapped Children Act; and with
respect to post-secondary and vocational services, a handicapped person who meets
the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the
recipient's educational program or activity. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (2) and (3) (1977).
A recipient may not provide separate aid, benefits, or services to handicapped per-
sons unless such action is necessary to provide qualified handicapped persons with
services that are as effective as those provided to others. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b) (1) (iv)
(1977).
If these non-academic services and activities are part of a recipient's education pro-
gram, they must be provided in the most integrated setting appropriate. 45 C.F.R. § 84
app. A No. 26 (1980).
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401-1461 (1975),
also requires that physical education be provided for all disabled students in the most
integrated setting appropriate.
136. "Physical or mental impairment" means (A) any physiologic disorder or condi-
tion, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, cardio-
vascular, reproductive, gastrointestional, genitourinary, endocrine, hemic and lymphic
and skin. (B) Mental or psychological impairments include: mental retardation, emo-
tional and mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (i)
(1977).
137. "Major life activities" means functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working. 45
C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (ii) (1977).
138. "Has a record of' means has a history of, or has been misclassified as having, a
mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activi-
ties. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2) (iii) (1977).
139. "Is regarded as having" means (A) has a physical or mental handicap that does
not substantially limit major life activities but that is treated by the recipient as consti-
tuting such a limitation; (B) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others toward such impair-
ment; or (C) has none of the impairments defined in [notes 134-1381, but is treated by
the recipient as having such an impairment. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j) (2) (iv) (1977). For ex-
ample, a person with a limp or a disfiguring scar. 45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A No. 3.
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loss of vision in one eye, diminished hearing, epilepsy or those
lacking a kidney or limb are therefore "handicapped" accord-
ing to the statutory definition.
The Act's goal is to provide athletic activities in the most in-
tegrated setting appropriate."4 A school may offer separate or
different physical education or athletic activities to disabled
students only if no qualified disabled students are denied the
opportunity to compete for teams or courses that are not
separate.14 1
A student is "qualified" for an athletic activity if he can meet
the academic and technical requisites for admission or partici-
pation. 42 However, construing the term "qualified" has posed
problems for the students, the schools and the courts. The ini-
tial responsibility for determining whether a student is quali-
fied is placed with the school's athletic director, team physician
and/or physical education teacher. The director, physician
and teacher must evaluate the handicapped athlete based on
the student's own performance, proficiencies or functional abil-
ities, 143 in accordance with the mandated procedures before
disqualifying the student from a regular sport. Those proce-
dures require:
a system of procedural safeguards that include notice, and an
opportunity for the parents or guardian of the person to ex-
amine relevant records, an impartial hearing with opportunity
for participation by the person's parents or guardian and repre-
sentation by counsel, and a review procedure.'"
Compliance with the procedural safeguards of section 615 of
the Education for all Handicapped Children Act of 1975 is one
means of meeting this requirement. 45 Section 615 requires
that parents or guardians of handicapped children be notified
of any proposed change in the "identification, evaluation or ed-
ucational placement" of their child and be permitted to bring a
complaint about such evaluation or education. 46 Complaints
must be resolved at an "impartial due process hearing," and
that decision may be appealed to the state educational agency
140. 45 C.F.R. § 84.37(b) (1977).
141. Id. at § 84.47(a).
142. Id. at § 84.3(k)(3).
143. Stein, supra note 4, at 30.
144. 45 C.F.R. § 84.36 (1977).
145. Section 615 of the Education of the Handicapped Act is codified at 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1415 (1975).
146. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b)(1)(A)-(E) (1975).
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which shall make an "independent decision." '147 If the student
fails to obtain relief at the state administrative hearing she has
the right to bring a civil action in any state court or district
court of the United States without regard to the amount in
controversy. 148
In Kampmeier v. Harris'49 a New York court addressed the
section 504 procedural requirements. The court noted that a
student could not be classified as handicapped and provided
with special physical education against the wishes of her par-
ents, at the sole discretion of the school physician. Moreover,
the court required a "determination" that the student needed
special education because of a physical handicap and found
that the determination had to be scrutinized under something
more than the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review.150
Therefore to comply with the Act, a school must give all in-
terested disabled students the opportunity to try out for regu-
lar athletic activities and teams. Eligibility decisions cannot be
based on sterotyped assumptions that a particular physical or
mental impairment disqualifies a student; rather, decisions
should be based on a realistic appraisal of the risks that a stu-
dent with a particular handicap faces based on the nature of
the sport involved and the likelihood of injury to the athlete
himself or to other participants.151
If the coach or school physician believes that a student
should be disqualified from a particular activity because of a
handicap, the school authorities must provide the student and
his parents with notice of the pending decision and provide the
opportunity for an impartial hearing on the matter. The stu-
dent, the parents, the student's personal physician and other
appropriate persons whose presence the student requests, in-
cluding legal counsel, must be given the opportunity to present
evidence of the student's ability to participate. When the ini-
tial decision is appealed through administrative channels, the
state educational agency must conduct an impartial review of
the previous hearing and may receive additional evidence from
experts with respect to handicapped children. The agency
147. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(b) (2) (1978).
148. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e) (2) (1978).
149. 93 Misc. 2d. 1032, 403 N.Y.S.2d 638 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
150. Id. at 1035, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 641.
151. Stein, supra note 4, at 30.
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then makes an independent decision. Finally, the student can
appeal an unfavorable decision to the state or federal courts.
The procedural mandates of section 504 are potentially the
disabled student's most potent weapon. Physically and men-
tally impaired athletes have been disqualified from participat-
ing because the school officials do not recognize nor appreciate
the student's capabilities but rather focus solely on the disabil-
ities. The procedural mandates, in essence, allow the students,
her parents, doctors and disability experts to educate the ath-
letic authorities: for example, the student may present evi-
dence of a new safety device (for athletes needing to protect a
particular body part), or medication (for those students with
epilepsy, asthma, diabetes, heart disease or cancer) or an im-
proved apparatus (for students missing a limb). This data will
help school authorities make a more realistic appraisal of the
risks involved and thus a more informed decision.
2. Suits Under Section 504
When a disabled student believes that an athletic eligibility
rule or decision unfairly disqualifies him, he may challenge the
school's action as violative of section 504.152 The Second Cir-
cuit Court has delineated four elements necessary to satisfy a
section 504 action. A plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a
"handicapped person" under the Act, (2) he is "otherwise qual-
ified" for the athletic activity, (3) he is being excluded from the
activity solely because of his handicap and (4) the defendant
school is receiving federal financial assistance.153
Physically or mentally impaired students and school authori-
ties have disagreed on the proper construction of the Act's
"otherwise qualified" for the activity term. The Supreme
Court interpreted section 504's provision in Southeastern Com-
munity College v. Davis."4 When Davis was denied admission
to the college's nursing program because she had a hearing im-
152. 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
153. Doe v. New York University, 666 F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir. 1981).
154. 442 U.S. 397 (1979). The Court noted that the regulation uses the term "quai-
fled handicapped person" instead of the statutory term "otherwise qualified handi-
capped person" because the Department believes that the omission is necessary in
order to comport with the intent of the statute. Read literally, "otherwise qualified
handicapped persons" include those who are qualified except for their handicap,
rather than in spite of their handicap. Thus, a blind person possessing all the qualifica-
tions for driving a bus except sight could be said to be "otherwise qualified" for the job.
45 C.F.R. § 84 app. A No. 5 (1977).
No. 3]
COMM/ENT L. J.
pairment she filed suit alleging a violation of section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. The Court held that there had been no vio-
lation and explained the meaning of the Act's "otherwise quali-
fied" terminology.
Section 504 by its terms does not compel educational institu-
tions to disregard the disabilities of handicapped individuals or
to make substantial modifications in their programs to allow
disabled persons to participate. Instead, it requires only that
an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual" not be ex-
cluded from participation in a federally funded program "solely
by reason of his handicap," indicating only that mere posses-
sion of a handicap is not a permissible ground for assuming an
inability to function in a particular context.155
However, the Court then limited the term, explaining that
this did not mean that a person need not meet legitimate phys-
ical requirements in order to be "otherwise qualified." "An
otherwise qualified person is one who is able to meet all of a
program's requirements in spite of his handicap."156
The Second Circuit further construed the term "qualified" in
Doe v. New York University . 57 In that case the court added
that a school is not required to disregard the disability of the
applicant if the impairment is relevant to reasonable admis-
sion qualifications. "The institution need not dispense with
reasonable precautions or requirements which it would nor-
mally impose for safe participation by students . . . ." 8
However, in Poole v. South Plainfield Board of Education,
the court decided that increased risk of irreversible injury
would not necessarily make a student "unqualified." The
plaintiff, at the time of the suit, was a healthy high school stu-
dent with one physical problem-he was born with only one
kidney. He had participated in the school wrestling program in
the eighth, ninth and tenth grades, but was barred from partici-
pating in the eleventh and twelfth grades when the school phy-
sician advised the school board that the plaintiff should not
155. 442 U.S. at 405.
156. Id. at 406.
157. 666 F.2d 761 (1981). Jane Doe was a medical student who filed an action seek-
ing readmission to medical school under section 504. She had a long history of psychi-
atric problems that had forced her to take a leave of absence from New York
University Medical School in 1976. In 1977, the school decided not to readmit her in
light of her severe problems and because of the risk that she might suffer a recurrence
under the stress of medical school.
158. Id. at 775.
159. 490 F. Supp. 948 (D.N.J. 1980).
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play because of the possibility of injury to his single kidney.
The plaintiff, Richard, his parents and two other physicians be-
lieved that Richard could safely wrestle, and brought suit
under section 504.
The Board contended that Richard was not qualified because
he failed to pass the physical exam necessary to participate on
the wrestling team. The court rejected that contention finding
that Richard had "failed" only because he was missing a kid-
ney. No one had suggested that he was incapable of pinning
his adversary to the mat or meeting the training requirements.
Rather, the Board's decision resulted solely from fear that
Richard would injure his single kidney. The court concluded
that the Board was not entitled to summary judgment or a dis-
missal of the section 504 claim because there was evidence that
Richard had been discriminated against solely because of his
"handicap." The court noted that Richard did face the risk of
grave injury but so did the other members of the wrestling
team.
Hardly a year goes by that there is not at least one instance of
the tragic death of a healthy youth as a result of competitive
sports activity. Life has risks. The purpose of Section 504,
however, is to permit handicapped individuals to live life as
fully as they are able, without paternalistic authorities decid-
ing that certain activities are too risky for them.
160
The Second Circuit court in New York University also stated
that in cases dealing with admission to a particular educational
program, "considerable judicial deference" would be given to
the school's evaluation of the applicant. Unless the student
produced evidence that the admission standard served "no
purpose other than to deny an education to handicapped per-
sons," the disqualification decision would stand.1
6
'
However, the Tenth Circuit in Pushkin v. Regents of the Uni-
versity of Colorado ,162 rejected the argument that an educa-
tional institution's decision not to admit a handicapped
student should be reviewed under the equal protection "ra-
tional basis" test. The court found that the rational basis test
was not applicable when the student alleged a violation of sec-
160. Id. at 953-54.
161. 666 F.2d at 776.
162. 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981). Joshua Pushkin, M.D., brought an action against
the University alleging violation of section 504 when he was denied admission to the
Psychiatric Residency Program because he had multiple sclerosis.
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tion 504. "Rather, the statute provides that a recipient of feder-
al financial assistance may not discriminate on the basis of
handicap, regardless of whether there is a rational basis for so
discriminating." 163
Therefore, while the courts will probably continue to give the
traditional deference to decisions made by educational institu-
tions when these decisions involve a disabled student, the
court should conduct a more searching review of the school's
reasons for disqualifying the handicapped applicant.
The Tenth Circuit in Pushkin also held that a prima facie
case under section 504 is established when (1) the plaintiff
demonstrates that he was an otherwise qualified handicapped
person apart from his handicap, and that he was rejected
under circumstances which lead to the inference that he was
rejected solely because of his handicap; (2) when the plaintiff
establishes his prima facie case, the defendent then has the
burden of going forward and proving that the plaintiff was not
an otherwise qualified handicapped person, or that his rejec-
tion was for reasons other than the handicap; (3) the plaintiff
then has the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence
demonstrating that the defendant's reasons for rejecting him
are "based on misconceptions or unfounded factual conclu-
sions," and that the reasons given for his rejection entail unjus-
tified consideration of the handicap itself.1 64
The Pushkin court's order of presentation of proof may help
the disabled student in athletic disqualification actions. The
following cases illustrate how burden of proof allocations can
win or lose a student's case.
In Kampmeier v. Nyquist 161 two junior high school students,
each with vision in only one eye, and their parents sought a
preliminary injunction against school authorities who had re-
fused to allow the students to participate in contact sports.
The students contended that the school's decision violated sec-
tion 504. The court, however, denied the motion stating:
As we read Section 504 ... exclusion of handicapped children
from a school activity is not improper if there exists a substan-
tial justification for the school's policy .... Here, the defend-
ants have relied on medical opinion that children with sight in
only one eye are not qualified to play in contact sports because
163. Id. at 1383.
164. 658 F.2d at 1387 (emphasis in original).
165. 553 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977).
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of the high risk of eye injury. The plaintiffs have presented lit-
tle evidence-medical, statistical, or otherwise-which would
cast doubt on the substantiality of this rationale. 166
However, the appellate opinion includes evidence that both
students were outstanding athletes, Margaret had special pro-
tective glasses, medical opinion as to the safety of participation
in contact sports for the two athletes was divided, and Mar-
garet's parents had agreed to release the school from liability
for any athletic injury to Margaret's seeing eye.
Here, as in Poole,167 the school board's decision seems to be
based on fear that an athletic injury could result in blindness
for the youngsters. In essence, the Kampmeier court ruled
that children with physical impairments should be sheltered
from the risk of serious injury. The Pushkin court very aptly
described the proof problem.
It would be a rare case indeed in which a hostile discriminatory
purpose ... could be shown. Discrimination on the basis of
handicap usually results from more invidious causative ele-
ments and often occurs under the guise of extending a helping
hand or a mistaken, restrictive belief as to the limitations of
handicapped persons.168
In a factually similar case, Wright v. Columbia University,6 '
the district court granted a temporary restraining order forbid-
ding the University from barring a student with vision in only
one eye from participating in its intercollegiate football pro-
gram. The court concluded that the plaintiff had "a reasonable
probability" of success on the merits because he offered proof
from a qualified ophthalmologist that no substantial risk of se-
rious eye injury related to football exists. In addition, the
plaintiff testified that he had seriously considered the risks in-
cident to playing football and willingly accepted them. Citing
the Poole decision, the court noted that while concern for its
students' well being was laudable, the University was prohib-
ited by section 504 from deciding that some sports were "too
risky" for a disabled student.1 70
166. Id. at 299 (emphasis added). Note that this case was decided before the Health
and Human Services implementing regulations were published in 1977.
167. See supra note 159.
168. 658 F.2d at 1385.
169. 520 F. Supp. 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
170. Id. at 794.
No. 3]
COMM/ENT L. J.
V
Conclusion
In the 1980's the courts began to shed their paternalistic atti-
tudes toward physically and mentally impaired youngsters and
allowed them to participate in athletic activities with their non-
handicapped peers. While most would agree that no student
should be allowed to encounter a patent risk of serious injury,
it is common knowledge that sporting events result in injuries.
Most injuries are minor, but a few are catastrophic. The basic
issue in eligibility decisions, however, should be who decides
whether the risk should be taken. Section 504 seems to man-
date that the disabled student along with his parents should
decide.
Section 504 requires that public schools provide handi-
capped students with an equal opportunity to participate in
athletic activities. Many physically or mentally impaired
youngsters are able to participate in regular physical education
classes and extracurricular sports teams. The Health and
Human Services implementing regulations address the
desirability of enabling as many students as possible to play
on regular teams and mandate specific procedural safeguards
to insure that students are not disqualified from participating
without notice and an opportunity to challenge that decision
through the administrative channels and in the courts.
If a student challenges a disqualification action in court, his
challenge will be most effective if brought under section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act and on equal protection grounds. For
the latter, the student should argue that he is entitled to inter-
mediate scrutiny judicial review because a classification based
on handicap is "quasi-suspect."
Physical activity is a basic human need. Society has become
more physically active in the last ten years, and disabled
youngsters have sought to join the group of physically-fit
Americans. Although these students have been able to over-
come their physical impediment to participating, they face ad-
ditional obstacles in the form of attitudinal barriers of school
officials. The equal protection clause and section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act can be effective in combatting handicap dis-
crimination in school athletic programs.
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